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CASE NOTES
Labor Law—Section 301 of LMRA—Contract Arbitration of a Juris-
dictional Dispute.—Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 1—The Interna-
tional Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (IUE), certified
representative of "all production and maintenance employees,' 4 not including
the "salaried technical . . . employees," at a Westinghouse plant, filed a
grievance with the Company, alleging that certain members of the Federation
of Westinghouse Independent Salaried Unions (Federation), certified to
represent the salaried technical personnel, were performing production and
maintenance work. IUE sought arbitration of the dispute pursuant to its
collective bargaining agreement with Westinghouse, which called for arbitra-
tion of any grievance involving "interpretation, application or claimed viola-
tion of a provision of the Agreement." Westinghouse refused, on the ground
that the question involved union representation which was within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. This view.
 was sus-
tained in the New York' state courts.2 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. HELD: Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act3 gives the state court jurisdiction to compel arbitration of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. A jurisdictional dispute, although possibly cog-
nizable by the National Labor Relations Board, does not necessitate the
surrender of jurisdiction, even if one union is not a party to the agreement.
There are two distinct types of jurisdictional disputes which, while
closely related, are sufficiently separable to create individual preemption
problems. In the instant ease, the nature of IUE's complaint could be (1)
that the disputed work should be performed by members of its bargaining
unit, or (2) that IUE has the right to represent the Federation members
doing that work. The former or "work assignment" controversy is governed
by the National Labor Relations Act only in the event of a strike or a
threat to strike.' Prior to that contingency no argument could be made
that Board jurisdiction precludes arbitration. 5 If framed as a "representa-
and if a labor dispute persisted and threatened to substantially interrupt inter-
state commerce to a degree such as to deprive a section of the country of
essential transportation service, then the Mediation Board could not notify the
President so that he might create an emergency board, as provided in Section
10 of the Railway Labor Act.
1 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
2 Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 11 N.Y.2d 452, 184 N.E.2d 298, 230 N.Y.S.2d
703 (1962).
61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 	 185(a) (1958). This section provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor orga-
nization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy and without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
4 Section 8(b) (4)(D) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141, 142
(1947), 29 U.S.C. 158 (1958), makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to strike
or threaten to do so to force the employer to assign work to it. Section 10(k),
61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 160(k) (1958) requires the Board to settle the dispute,
when such an unfair labor practice is alleged.
5 Or so one would think. Yet, in Local 1505, 	 Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
Local 1836, Ass'n of Machinists, 304 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1962), an action to compel
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tional" problem, however, the dispute would be within the immediate purview
of the NLRB, and the preemption issue would become paramount.° The
Court declines in the present case to decide which of the two hybrids is
involved, reasoning that in either event arbitration would be advantageous?
In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 8 the Supreme Court
held that when labor activity was even arguably "within the compass" of
the National Labor Relations Act, the state's jurisdiction was displaced.
The preemption principle was based on the belief that since statutory and
tort law involve rules designed by government, imposed upon the parties
from without, a diversity of tribunals applying a variety of procedures would
inevitably result in conflict and upset the proper statutory balance between
labor and management interests.' However, since the conduct prescribed by
a collective bargaining agreement is self-imposed, the above considerations do
not apply. The Court has held that in such a situation the preemption
doctrine is not relevant," Congress having "deliberately chose[n] to leave the
enforcement of collective agreements 'to the usual processes of the law.' " 11
Thus, in Smith v. Evening News, 12
 the Court held that section 301 gives the
state jurisdiction to entertain suits for breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment even when the breaching conduct would constitute an unfair labor
practice cognizable by the NLRB." It did, however, make a qualification as
to the universality of the rule:
If . . . there are situations in which serious problems will arise
from both the courts and the Board having jurisdiction over acts
arbitration of a work assignment dispute, the court held that such "jurisdictional
disputes between unions are precisely in its [NLRB's] province." For this view the
court relied on NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs Union, 364 U.S. 573
(1961), where the Board exercised jurisdiction only after persistent work stoppages.
For a similar holding, see International Chem. Workers Union v. Olin Mathieson
Chem. Corp., 202 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. Ill. 1962). This philosophy has been expressly
rejected in Carey v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1963) and Retail Clerks
Union v. Thriftimart Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 421, 380 P.2d 652, 30 Cal. Rep. 12 (1963).
6 A charge could be brought under § 8(a)(5), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1958), or a petition under 9(c) (1), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c) (1) (1958). The union could thus either allege a failure to bargain collectively.
with the employee representatives or in the alternative for a clarification of its Board
certificate.
Supra note 1, at 272. "However the dispute be considered—whether one involving
work assignment or one concerning representation—we see no barrier to use of the
arbitration procedure."
6 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
8 Brief for the Solicitor General as Amicus Curiae, p. 9. Garner v. Teamsters
Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953).
to Teamsters, Local 174 v. Lucas Flower Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 n.9 (1962);
Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 245 n.5 (1962).
11 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 513 (1962).
12 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
13 If a state court can hear such breach actions, it can perforce compel arbitration
of them. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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which amount to an unfair labor practice, we shall face those cases
when they arise?'
It is Westinghouse's contention that if the unfair labor practice involves
a representational right, concurrent jurisdiction would precipitate the
"serious problems" situation Smith reserved, and justify retention of sole
jurisdiction in the NLRB.
Any problems which concurrent jurisdiction would create must, how-
ever, be balanced against those it tends to solve. In so doing, the Court
grounds its decision primarily on its belief that in this case the use of
arbitration machinery would contribute more significantly to industrial
peace." The point is then raised, however, that the arbitration will be
neither final nor binding, due to its failure to include Federation, and that
inevitably the NLRB will be forced to decide the dispute." This contention
appears to have merit since it is clear that the Board is empowered to review
the arbiter's award, [ ' and it is likely that Federation will demand that it
do so.
Since Federation has an identical arbitration clause in its contract with
Westinghouse, it could seek relief from that source, although this seems
unlikely. A defeat before the arbiter would presumably foreclose the matter
unfavorably, 18 while victory would result in two antithetical awards which
inevitably would require NLRB unravelling." Federation could go im-
mediately before the Board by engaging in a strike, if the arbiter's award
were framed in terms of work assignment, or, if framed in representational
terms, by filing a section 8(a) (5) charge or a 9(c) (1) petition as already
outlined. The Board will normally show deference to an arbital award which
is not "tainted by fraud, collusion, unfairness or serious procedural irregu-
larities. . . ."2° But the absence of a party whose rights were adversely
affected may constitute such a procedural irregularity. 2 ' This should be the
14 Smith v. Evening News, supra note 12, at 197-98.
15 Supra note 1, at 271. Citing International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 926,
51 L.R.R.M. 1155, 1156 (1962), the Court stated:
The Act [NLRA], . . . is primarily designed to promote industrial peace and
stability by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.
Experience has demonstrated that collective bargaining agreements that provide
for final and binding arbitration of grievance and disputes arising thereunder,
"as a substitute for industrial strife," contribute significantly to the attainment
of this statutory objective.
16 Brief for the respondent, p. 16.
17 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958). Section 10(a) provides:
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice. . . . This power shall not be
affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may
be established by agreement, law or otherwise.
18 Acoustical Contractors Ass'n of Cleveland, 119 N.L.R.B. 1345, 1353, 41 L.R.R.M.
1293, 1298 (1958); A. W. Lee, Inc., 113 N.L.R.B. 947, 953-54, 36 L.R.R.M. 1414,
1416 ( 1955 ).
19 It is inconceivable that , any union, in this case Federation, after pressing for
and receiving an arbital award, would quietly allow it to be disregarded.
20 International Harvesting Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 927, 51 L.R.R.M. 1155, 1157
(1962).
21 The Board has stated: "Assuming that in some circumstances an arbitration
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case, "[u]nless all the salutary safeguards of due process are to be dissipated
and obliterated to further the cause of arbitration." 22 This is especially true
since the employer can not be regarded as in any way representing the
interests of the non-party union.23 The Court's position then, that arbitra-
tion of jurisdictional disputes will foster industrial peace is no more than
conjectural. Practical considerations may lead to the converse conclusion 2 4
The Court also suggests that NLRB resolution of a representational
dispute will leave unsettled issues still to be arbitrated," and unwanted
fragmentation can only be averted by allowing the arbiter initial authority
to decide every aspect of the controversy. This position contains the same
weakness as the one above: Unless the arbitration is final, fragmentation
will still be the result. Assuming Federation challenges the representational
award and the NLRB exercises its authority to readjudicate, the arbitrator
will have made an award dependent on a representational settlement, before
that settlement was final and irrevocable.. Of course, any "work assignment"
rulings made by an arbiter based on a representational determination later
reversed by the Board would become a nullity.
In that event an even more serious problem would arise. If Federation
members lost work due to the award, the NLRB, in reversing that decision,
could force the employer, for doing no more than obeying the arbitration
award, to reimburse the affected workers." And the courts might do the
same if the workers chose to bypass both arbitration and the Board. 22 The
majority's answer is certainly not satisfying to the employer:
Should the Board disagree with the arbiter, by ruling, for example,
that the employees involved in the controversy are members of one
bargaining unit or another, the Board's ruling would, of course,
take precedence; and if the employer's action had been in accord
award might be significant, as the S.U.P. was not a party to the awards limiting the
sailors to work in one hatch, we find no merit to the I.L.W.IL's contention that such
awards in its favor are determinative of the case." International Longshoremen's & Ware-
housemen's Union, 94 N.L.R.B. 388, 397-98, 28 L.R.R.M. 1055 (1951). But see Raley's
Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 53 L.R.R.M. 1347 (1963). Note that in this latter decision
the non-party union was not the certified bargaining representative of any employees.
22 Supra note 1, at 274 (dissenting opinion).
23 As the Supreme Court said in NLRB v. Radio & Television Engr's, 364 U.S.
573, 579 (1960), such a controversy "in most instances, is of so little interest to the
employer that he seems perfectly willing to assign work to either [union] if the other
will just let him alone."
24 Both the Majority and concurring opinions stress that the undesirable con-
sequences of duplicative proceedings are conjectural. But it is also conjectural that the
arbitration will finalize the dispute. Since it appears more likely that Federation would
oppose an adverse award, the majority's position must be considered the more con-
jectural.
23 If IUE wins a representational action, it will likely try to displace the ex-
Federationists with its own men, on the basis that the ex-Federationists are junior to
everyone else in its bargaining unit. This seniority problem would turn on the inter-
pretation of the collective bargaining agreement, and be arbitrable. See Sovern, Section
301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 529, 574 (1963).
26 Id. at 571.




with that ruling, it would not be liable for damages under § 301."
(Emphasis supplied.)
An employer would be wise under this analysis to disregard the arbitrator,
if he can anticipate a contrary finding by the Board. This would, of course,
merely leave him open to a damage action by the initially victorious union,
should the Board not disagree. To so penalize a "bad guess" would seem
contrary "to the basic principles of common everyday justice."2°
No decision by the Court could have averted more than a few of these
difficulties. For instance, if representational actions alone are preempted by
Board jurisdiction, a union which desired that relief could still, if it wished,
frame its argument in the nature of work assignments° If work assignment
disputes are also held non-arbitrable, unfair labor practices would be en-
couraged, since a union would have to strike before the Board, the only
other agency to which it would have recourse, acquired jurisdiction. 31 Fi-
nally, even the possibility of arbitration of a jurisdictional dispute would
necessarily be eliminated.
It is more accurate to say that arbitration must be inherently defective
when a party necessary to a binding adjudication is absent. Since all the
dilemmas ultimately revolve around the lack of one union's participation,
the simple solution would be to provide an arbitial forum where both unions
would be heard and bound by the result. The state court, in the instant case,
might have allowed Federation to intervene," or the arbiter might take that
step on his own motion; 33 but there is no certainty that either would, or
under all circumstances, even could.34 While one union is not represented,
28 Supra note 1, at 272.
29 Id. at 275 (dissenting opinion).
133 This may be exactly what happened in the instant case. The original grievance
complained that "the employees working on induction heating and . . . performing
assembly and wiring; power break operations; machine operations; and attending to
the tool crib and storeroom operations should be in the IUE, Local 130 bargaining
unit." Brief for the Solicitor General as Amicus Curiae, p. 22. While the Solicitor
General and the respondent both interpreted the complaint as representational, IUE's
theory, at least on this appeal, was work assignment. But the nature of the dispute may
depend "wholly upon the way in which the issue is formulated by the moving party
for its own tactical advantage." Amicus Curiae brief, p. 13.
34 See supra note 5.
32 Significantly enough, IUE did not ask the court to interplead Federation. In
Local 1836, Ass'n of Machinists v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 201 F. Supp. 334, 337 (D. Mass.
1962), the court refused to allow a non-party union to intervene, holding that the
contract called for arbitration solely between the employer and suing union. While the
decision was reversed on other grounds, 304 F.2d 356, supra note 5, the party union
insisted on appeal that it had a contractual right to arbitrate with the employer alone.
33 National Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 625, 635-36 (decision of arbitra-
tor, 1963).
34 "It seems to me there can be no intervenor in an arbitration proceeding by one
not a party to the contract." Dumas v. Upland Bros. Inc., 16 Lab. Arb. 588, 589 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, 1951). "Sec. 22 of the rules of the [American Arbitration]
Association provide for only those with a direct interest in a proceeding to participate.
If any party could intervene in an arbitration merely by showing that it might be
affected in some way by the decision, many intervenors might present themselves."
Ball. Bros. Co., 27 Lab. Arb. 353, 354 (decision of arbitrator, 1956).
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keeping in mind the disadvantages implicit in either result, the Court would
still seem best advised to
refuse to order arbitration of a work assignment [or representa-
tional] dispute whenever only one of the contending unions would
be a party to the arbitration proceeding. Whatever difficulties
recourse to the NLRB may pose, that forum can produce a definite,
peaceful solution at least some of the time. An arbitration pro-
ceeding with one of the vitally interested parties missing holds no
such promise."
If the decision holds little promise of a definitive solution in this type
of situation, it does, at the same time, substantially reinforce the policy
premium presently paid both arbitration and section 301 actions. Since
arbitration will be accommodated even in such an inherently imperfect setting,
it can certainly expect continued broad encouragement. Moreover, if the
instant case does not present a problem of sufficient seriousness to require
application of the preemption rationale, few, if any, other cases will, and the
trend toward court determination of all alleged collective bargaining breaches
is likewise strengthened. Thus, by not engrafting an exception to the Smith
rationales° on these facts, the Court lends further support to the non-exclusive-
ness of section 301 actions, which may well be the primary significance of
the opinion.
THOMAS F. COLLINS
Labor Law—Section 301 of LMRA—Refusal to Remand to State Court
for Injunction for Breach of No-Strike Clause.—H. A. Lott v. Hoisting
el Portable Engineers' Union.'—This is an action in contract brought
in a state court by an employer against a union for damages and injunc-
tive relief for breach of the no-strike clause in their collective bargaining
agreement. The defendants petitioned for removal to the United States
District Court, predicating jurisdiction on Section 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)? Upon removal the plaintiff
moved in the District Court for remand of his petition to the state court
for an injunction inasmuch as Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Acts pre-
cludes the federal court from granting the equitable relief requested. On
this motion to remand the court HELD: Under the removal statute* the
suit for damages could be transferred to the federal court. Therefore, in
the interests of a uniform approach to section 301 cases the court will
85 Sovern, supra note 25, at 576.
86 See quote in text, supra at note 14, Smith v. Evening News, supra note 12, at
197-98.
1 222 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Texas 1963).
2 Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1958).
3 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
4 Judiciary and Judicial Procedure § 1441(c), 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(c) (1958).
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